First, the Israeli Attorney General moved on February 28 to indict PM Netanyahu on several separate bribery charges. Much like scandals in America these days, the supporters of Netanyahu consider it irrelevant, and his detractors advocate for removal of Netanyahu for corruption. The inner circles of Likkud, however, are concerned and planning for a world - perhaps - without Netanyahu later this year. In the meantime, he is weakened but still in charge. What is the answer? Netanyahu has a well earned reputation for strength in security issues, and a conflict usually immunizes him from criticism while he manages the crisis.
Second, Hamas has failed in its ability to provide economic development, salaries, and charitable aid in the Gaza Strip. Qatar has been physically moving U.S. dollars into Gaza to distribute some of these resources through the postal offices, but in the last month massive protests against Hamas broke out inside the Gaza strip, and Hamas cracked down with large scale arrests and heavy handed repression of the protests. Hamas' popularity in the Gaza Strip is based on two primary issues: 1) a network of social supports and subsidies called ikhwan, and 2) its identity as primary resistance to Israel. The real power lies in the former and the political attention accrues to the latter. With #1 collapsing, Hamas has chosen to fire missiles at Israel to create a larger conflict which will force its population to focus on #2. Hamas has learned the lessons of distraction and manipulation well.
Meanwhile, Kahol Lavan's leadership includes 3 former Israeli Army chiefs of staff, but as people get to know Benny Ganz the shine is off the chrome and early energetic leads are cooling off. Netanyahu is certainly under pressure. Given Hamas rocket fire deep into Israel proper, Netanyahu has called up the reserves and mobilized the tank corps. However, it's not clear how a military strategy will play with so many generals running in opposition.
Add to that President Trump's recognition of the complete annexation of the Golan Heights, and the resume of right wing topics are all in play during the last 12 days of the election. The left usually seeks to emphasis economic development, civil obligations and rights, and peace. No one is talking about that agenda seriously in the moment, and the outcomes are extremely murky.
One important development today is that Eli Yishai, former head of shas and current head of Yachad (a far right religious party) has withdrawn from the elections and thrown his support to United Torah Judaism. Shas and UTJ together will account for 11-13 seats under current polling and would certainly be a necessary part of any coalition.
Also interesting, the Bennet/Shaked party "The New Right" has become embroiled in a controversy over a recent ad, and are suffering a momentary drop in support - barely meeting the electoral threshold for the Kenesset. Presumedly, they will rebound, but who knows? Should they fail, it will be a tremendous miscalculation by former stars of the right.
Finally, on the far left in the Arab parties, Ra'am-Balad look to be losing all 8 seats and not meeting their threshold either. This is important because Balad is the main Israeli Arab citizen intellectual party, seeking pure democracy regardless of ethnic or religious identity and Ra'am is the largest Beduin party. The remaining "Arab" parties (Hadash-Ta'al) are problematic: Ta'al is a very strong critic of Israel's policies, particularly in Gaza and the West Bank, and Hadash is the Communist party. Should Ra'am and Balad be represented by Ta'al in the new Kenesset, it could further polarize internal debate.
Here are the Poll Numbers over the last few weeks. Scroll the chart to the right to see the entire display:
- Legend
- C — sum of current government coalition parties, including: Likud, Kulanu, Shas, United Torah Judaism, Union of Right-Wing Parties (created in February 2019), and New Right (created in December 2018).
| Date | Polling firm | Hadash –Ta'al | Ra'am –Balad | Meretz | Labor | Blue & White | Kulanu | Gesher | Yisrael Beiteinu | Likud | Zehut | New Right | URWP | Shas | UTJ | C |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current seats[3] | 5 | 8 | 5 | 18 | 11 | 10 | 1 | 5 | 30 | N/A | 3 | 5 | 7 | 6 | 61 | |
| 27 Mar | Yahad announces withdrawal[4] | |||||||||||||||
| 27 Mar | Panels Politics/Walla![5] | 8 | (1.9%) | 5 | 9 | 30 | 4 | (2.6%) | 4 | 31 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 59 |
| 26 Mar | Midgam/Army Radio[6] | 8 | (1.6%) | 5 | 10 | 30 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 28 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 55 |
| 26 Mar | TNS/Kan[7] | 7 | 5 | 5 | 8 | 30 | 6 | (2.6%) | (2.1%) | 28 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 59 |
| 24 Mar | Midgam/Channel 12[8] | 7 | 4 | 4 | 10 | 32 | (2.6%) | 4 | 4 | 28 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 51 |
| 24 Mar | Panel Project HaMidgam/Statnet/Channel 13[9] | 7 | 4 | 5 | 10 | 31 | 5 | (1.6%) | (2.4%) | 28 | 6 | 5 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 57 |
| 22 Mar | Panels Politics/Maariv[10] | 9 | – | 6 | 9 | 30 | 4 | – | 5 | 31 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 4 | 7 | 57 |
| 22 Mar | Maagar Mochot/Israel Hayom & i24 News[11] | 5 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 30 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 26 | 6 | 5 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 52 |
| 22 Mar | Smith/Jerusalem Post[12] | 8 | 4 | 5 | 8 | 30 | 5 | (2.8%) | 4 | 27 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 57 |
| 20 Mar | Midgam/iPanel/Channel 12[13] | 8 | 4 | 4 | 10 | 32 | 4 | (1.6%) | 4 | 27 | 4 | 6 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 54 |
| 20 Mar | Panel Project HaMidgam/Channel 13[14] | 7 | 4 | 5 | 9 | 31 | 5 | (2.3%) | (2.2%) | 29 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 59 |
| 19 Mar | Panels Politics/Walla![15] | 9 | (2.5%) | 6 | 8 | 29 | 4 | (2.9%) | 5 | 32 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 59 |
| 17 Mar | Direct Polls/Kan[16] | 8 | 4 | 6 | 9 | 30 | (2.1%) | (1.1%) | 4 | 31 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 6 | 55 |
| 14 Mar | Maagar Mochot/Israel Hayom & i24 News[17] | 6 | (2%) | 8 | 7 | 33 | 5 | (2%) | 5 | 26 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 56 |
| 14 Mar | Midgam/iPanel/Channel 12[18] | 7 | 4 | 4 | 10 | 31 | 4 | (2.3%) | 4 | 28 | 4 | 4 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 56 |
| 13 Mar | Direct Polls/Makor Rishon[19] | 9 | (2.6%) | 6 | 10 | 32 | (2.7%) | (1.7%) | (2.9%) | 32 | 4 | 7 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 59 |
| 11 Mar | Panel HaMidgam Project/Statnet/Channel 13[20] | 7 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 31 | 4 | (2.3%) | 4 | 28 | 4 | 6 | 7 | 5 | 6 | 56 |
| 7-8 Mar | Midgam/iPanel/Yediot Ahronot[21] | 7 | 4 | 5 | 10 | 33 | 4 | (2%) | 4 | 29 | (3.1%) | 5 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 57 |
| 7 Mar | Dialog/Haaretz[22] | 8 | 4 | 4 | 10 | 31 | 4 | (1.8%) | (2%) | 28 | 4 | 7 | 8 | 5 | 7 | 59 |
| 7 Mar | Maagar Mochot/Israel Hayom & i24 News[23] | 9 | (2%) | 8 | 8 | 33 | 4 | (2%) | (1%) | 26 | 4 | 8 | 8 | 4 | 8 | 58 |
| 5 Mar | TNS/Kan[24] | 8 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 35 | 5 | (2%) | (2%) | 30 | 4 | 5 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 57 |
| 5 Mar | Smith/Channel 20[25] | 9 | 4 | 5 | 7 | 31 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 29 | (3%) | 6 | 6 | 5 | 6 | 56 |
| 5 Mar | Midgam/Channel 12[26] | 8 | 4 | 4 | 9 | 36 | 5 | (2.2%) | (2.7%) | 30 | (2.0%) | 5 | 6 | 6 | 7 | 59 |
| 5 Mar | Panels Politics/Walla! News[27] | 9 | (1.6%) | 6 | 8 | 36 | 6 | (2.7%) | (2.8%) | 31 | (2.6%) | 6 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 61 |
| 3 Mar | Panels Politics/Channel 12[28] | 9 | (2.2%) | 6 | 8 | 38 | 5 | (2.8%) | (2.1%) | 30 | (2.9%) | 6 | 7 | 4 | 7 | 59 |
| 1 Mar | Panel HaMidgam Project/Statnet/Channel 13[29] | 9 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 36 | 4 | (2.3%) | (2.3%) | 30 | (1.6%) | 5 | 7 | 6 | 7 | 59 |
| 1 Mar | TNS/Kan[30] | 7 | 5 | 6 | 6 | 37 | 5 | (3%) | (2%) | 29 | (3%) | 7 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 59 |
| 28 Feb | Maariv[31] | 11 | (1.5%) | 5 | 6 | 35 | 5 | (3%) | 4 | 29 | (2.9%) | 6 | 7 | 5 | 7 | 59 |
| 28 Feb | Maagar Mochot/Israel Hayom & i24 News[32] | 7 | (1%) | 6 | 7 | 38 | 4 | (2%) | (2%) | 29 | (3%) | 8 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 62 |
| 27 Feb | Number 10 Strategies/The Times of Israel[33] | 7 | 4 | 4 | 8 | 36 | 4 | (1%) | 4 | 29 | – | 8 | 5 | 4 | 7 | 57 |
| 24 Feb | Maagar Mochot/Israel Hayom & i24 News[34] | 7 | (2%) | 7 | 8 | 36 | (2%) | (2%) | (3%) | 31 | (2%) | 9 | 8 | 7 | 7 | 62 |
| 24 Feb | Midgam/iPanel/Yediot Ahronot[35] | 7 | 5 | 4 | 9 | 35 | 4 | (3%) | 4 | 29 | (3.1%) | 6 | 5 | 5 | 7 | 56 |
| 22 Feb | Maagar Mochot/Radio 103 FM[36] | 6 | 8 | 5 | 6 | 34 | 4 | – | 4 | 27 | – | 6 | 7 | 4 | 6 | 54 |
| 21 Feb | Deadline for party lists to be submitted[37] | |||||||||||||||
No comments:
Post a Comment